Damien Besancenot (), Kim Huynh () and Radu Vranceanu ()
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Damien Besancenot: Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord (CEPN) and Université Paris 13, Postal: 99 Av J.B. Clément, 93430 VILLETANEUSE, FRANCE
Kim Huynh: Laboratoire d'économie moderne (LEM) and Université Paris 2, Postal: 5/7, avenue Vavin, 75006 PARIS, FRANCE
Radu Vranceanu: ESSEC Business School, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch - BP 50105, 95021 CERGY-PONTOISE Cedex, FRANCE
Abstract: Given the myriad of journal titles in economics and business administration, scholars can sometimes target the wrong journal. This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic publications that brings into the picture this type of informational friction. The key modelling device is a paper-to-journal matching function, similar to the matching function traditional in labor economics. An equilibrium is defined as a situation where both editors and authors implement their optimal publication strategies. The model is then solved for the equilibrium submission fee, desk rejection rate and ratio between the number of editors and the number of authors.
Keywords: Academic Journals; Editors; Imperfect Information; Matching
19 pages, February 2010
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