European Business Schools Librarian's Group

ESSEC Working Papers,
ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

No WP1104: A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market

Damien Besancenot (), Kim Huynh () and Radu Vranceanu ()
Additional contact information
Damien Besancenot: Université paris 13
Kim Huynh: Université Paris 2
Radu Vranceanu: ESSEC Business School, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch - B.P. 50105, 95021 CERGY PONTOISE Cedex, FRANCE

Abstract: This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic publications. Given imperfect information about journals’editorial line, authors can sometimes target a wrong journal; in turn, the editor will desk-reject their paper. An equilibrium is de…ned as a situation where both editors and authors implement their optimal publication strategies, given the matching technology and the prevailing surplus sharing rule. The model can be solved for the equilibrium submission fee, desk rejection rate and ratio between the number of editors and the number of authors.

Keywords: Academic journals; Desk-rejection; Publishing; Matching; Imperfect information

JEL-codes: A14; C78

23 pages, July 13, 2011

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