European Business Schools Librarian's Group
ESSEC Working Papers,
ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School
No WP1310: Coordination in Teams: A Real Effort-task Experiment with Informal Punishment
Radu Vranceanu (), Fouad El Ouardighi () and Delphine Dubart ()
Additional contact information
Radu Vranceanu: ESSEC Business School, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch, B.P. 50105, 95021 CERGY-PONTOISE Cedex, FRANCE,
Fouad El Ouardighi: ESSEC Business School, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch, B.P. 50105, 95021 CERGY-PONTOISE Cedex, FRANCE,
Delphine Dubart: ESSEC Business School, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch, B.P. 50105, 95021 CERGY-PONTOISE Cedex, FRANCE,
Abstract: This paper reports the results from a real-effort team production experiment, where best performers can impose either tacit or explicit sanctions on their less-performing partners. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs from one condition to another. When explicit sanctions are not allowed, good performers reduce their effort in response to the advantageous difference in scores; when they can impose sanctions, their change in effort is no longer related to the difference in scores. To some extent, a mechanism of explicit sanctions allows good performers to focus on their own performance. Not sanctioning an opponent who under-performs, what we refer to as forgiveness, prompts the latter to improve his performance, but applying the sanction has a stronger effect.
Keywords: Team work; Performance; Experimental economics; Punishment
28 pages, August 2013
Full text files
WP1310.pdf
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Sophie Magnanou ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-13010This page generated on 2024-10-19 15:41:33.