Gilles G. Grolleau (), Angela Sutan () and Radu Vranceanu ()
Additional contact information
Gilles G. Grolleau: LAMETA, UMR 1135 and LESSAC, Postal: 2 place Viala, 34060 MONTPELLIER Cedex 1, FRANCE
Angela Sutan: LESSAC, Postal: 29 rue Sambin - B.P. 50608, 21006 DIJON Cedex, FRANCE
Radu Vranceanu: ESSEC Business School and THEMA, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch - B.P. 50105, 95021 CERGY-PONTOISE Cedex, FRANCE
Abstract: We investigate the dynamics of cooperation in public good games when contributions to the public good are immediately redistributed across contributors (intra-temporal transfers) and when contributions to the public good by the current group are transferred over time to a future group (inter-temporal transfers). We show that people are more cooperative in inter-temporal contexts than in intra-temporal contexts. We also find that subjects invest more on average in public goods when they know in advance their inheritance from the past.
Keywords: Public goods; Voluntary contribution mechanism; Inter-temporal vs intra-temporal transfers; Sustainable development
16 pages, September 2013
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WP1313.pdf
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