European Business Schools Librarian's Group

ESSEC Working Papers,
ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

No WP1501: Bank funding constraints and the cost of capital of small firms

Oana Peia () and Radu Vranceanu ()
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Oana Peia: ESSEC Business School, Postal: AVENUE BERNARD HIRSCH, CS 50105 CERGY, 95021 CERGY PONTOISE CEDEX, FRANCE
Radu Vranceanu: ESSEC Business School, Postal: AVENUE BERNARD HIRSCH, CS 50105 CERGY, 95021 CERGY PONTOISE CEDEX, FRANCE

Abstract: This paper analyzes how banks' funding constraints impact the access and cost of capital of small firms. Banks raise external finance from a large number of small investors who face co-ordination problems and invest in small, risky businesses. When investors observe noisy signals about the true implementation cost of real sector projects, the model can be solved for a threshold equilibrium in the classical global games approach. We show that a "socially optimal" interest rate that maximizes the probability of success of the small firm is higher than the risk-free rate, because higher interest rates relax the bank's funding constraint. However, banks will generally set an interest rate higher than this socially optimal one. This gives rise to a built-in inefficiency of banking intermediation activity that can be corrected by various policy measures.

Keywords: Bank finance; Small business; Global games; Optimal return; Strategic uncertainty

JEL-codes: C72; D82; G21; G32

18 pages, January 2015

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