European Business Schools Librarian's Group
ESSEC Working Papers,
ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School
No WP1503: Fear of novelty : a model of scientific discovery with strategic uncertainty
Damien Besancenot () and Radu Vranceanu ()
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Damien Besancenot: Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord (CEPN), Postal: 99, avenue JB Clément, 93430 VILLETANEUSE, FRANCE
Radu Vranceanu: ESSEC Business School and THEMA, Postal: AVENUE BERNARD HIRSCH, CS 50105 CERGY, 95021 CERGY PONTOISE CEDEX, FRANCE
Abstract: This paper analyzes the production of fundamental research as a coordination game played by scholars. In the model, scholars decide to adopt a new idea only if they believe that a critical mass of peers is following a similar research strategy. If researchers observe only a noisy idiosyncratic signal of the true scientiÖc potential of a new idea, we show that the game presents a single threshold equilibrium. In this environment, fundamental research proceeds with large structural breaks followed by long periods of time in which new ideas are unsuccessful. The likelihood of a new idea emerging depends on various parameters, including the rewards of working in the old paradigm, the critical mass of researchers required to create a new school of thought and scholarsí ability to properly assess the scientific value of new ideas.
Keywords: Economics of science; Scientific discovery; Strategic complementarity; Strategic uncertainty; Global games
19 pages, February 2015
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