Gilles Grolleau (), Guillermo Mateu (), Angela Sutan () and Radu Vranceanu ()
Additional contact information
Gilles Grolleau: SupAgro LAMETA (Laboratoire Montpelliérain d’Économie Théorique et Appliquée) and LESSAC, ESC Dijon, Postal: SupAgro LAMETA, Bat 26, 2 place Pierre Viala , 34 060 MONTPELLIER Cedex 01, FRANCE
Guillermo Mateu: LESSAC, ESC Dijon, Postal: 29 Rue Sambin , 21000 DIJON, FRANCE
Angela Sutan: LESSAC, ESC Dijon, and LAMETA, Postal: 29 Rue Sambin , 21000 DIJON, FRANCE
Radu Vranceanu: ESSEC Business School and THEMA, Cergy, Postal: AVENUE BERNARD HIRSCH, CS 50105 Cergy, 95021 CERGY PONTOISE Cedex, FRANCE
Abstract: This paper builds an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (to pledge) can increase their actual donation. Individuals’ endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely private, public and irrevocable ones, which differ in individual cost of not keeping a promise. Public pledges appear to be associated to lower donation levels. Irrevocable pledges ensure an amount of donations equal to donations in absence of pledges. Moreover, a significant number of individuals keep their promises, in presence of either private or public pledges. A higher risk attached to the endowment increases donations.
Keywords: Charity giving; Pledge; Commitment; Communication; Experiments
28 pages, June 2015
Full text files
document![]()
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Sophie Magnanou ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-15012This page generated on 2024-10-19 15:41:33.