European Business Schools Librarian's Group

ESSEC Working Papers,
ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

No WP1514: Experimental Evidence on Gender Interaction in Lying Behavior

Seeun Jung () and Radu Vranceanu ()
Additional contact information
Seeun Jung: ESSEC Business School and THEMA, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch, CS 50105 Cergy, 95021 CERGY PONTOISE Cedex, FRANCE
Radu Vranceanu: ESSEC Business School and THEMA, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch, CS 50105 Cergy, 95021 CERGY PONTOISE Cedex, FRANCE

Abstract: The paper reports results from an Ultimatum Game experiment with asymmetric information where Proposers can send to Responders misleading information about their endowment. We allow for all possible gender combinations in the Proposer-Responder pairs. Proposer messages that underestimate the actual amount are quite widespread. The frequency of lying is slightly higher in mixed groups. Conditional on lying, men tend to state bigger lies than women. On the other hand, women tend to tell smaller lies when paired with men, than when paired with women. In general, women present higher acceptance rates than men.

Keywords: Gender studies; Ultimatum Game; Asymmetric information; Lies; Extensive vs. intensive margin

JEL-codes: C72; C91; D83; J16

17 pages, First version: August 2015. Revised: October 2015.

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