European Business Schools Librarian's Group

ESSEC Working Papers,
ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

No WP1709: An equilibrium search model of the French dual market for medical services

Damien Besancenot () and Radu Vranceanu ()
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Damien Besancenot: ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School, Postal: University of Paris Descartes and LIRAES, 45, rue des Saints Pères, 75270 Paris
Radu Vranceanu: ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School, Postal: ESSEC Research Center, BP 105, 95021 Cergy, France

Abstract: The French market for specialist physician care has a dual structure, including a sector 1 with regulated fees, and a sector 2 where physicians can freely choose fees. Patients who undergo a sequential search process for the best medical o¤er develop a reservation fee decision rule. We analyzed physicians decisions to work in sector 1 or in sector 2, and their choice of fee in sector 2. The model features several pure strategy equilibria that can be ordered with respect to patient welfare. Policy implications follow.

Keywords: Equilibrium search; Medical fee dispersion; Dual market; Regulation

JEL-codes: D83; I11; I18

14 pages, June 6, 2017

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