ESSEC Working Papers,
ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

Abstract: The important flows of irregular migration could not exist without the emergence of a criminal market for smuggling services. A matching model à la Pissarides (2000) provides a well-suited framework to analyze such a flow market with significant trade frictions. Our analysis considers the competitive segment of this underground market in which small-business smugglers can freely enter. The model allows us to determine the equilibrium number of smugglers, the matching probability, the number of successful irregular migrants and, as an original concept, the equilibrium migrant welfare. Changes in parameters can be related to the various policies implemented by destination countries to cut down irregular migration.

Keywords: Smuggling; Irregular migration; Matching model; Migrant welfare

JEL-codes: F22; J46; O15

37 pages, January 30, 2020

Full text files

document  Full text

Download statistics

• ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School
• Home page for this series

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Sophie Magnanou ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-20002This page generated on 2024-10-19 15:41:33.