European Business Schools Librarian's Group

SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance,
Stockholm School of Economics

No 244: Payments in Kind

Tore Ellingsen ()
Additional contact information
Tore Ellingsen: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract: Payments in kind pose an enduring and empirically important puzzle. The paper provides a formalization of the popular view that payment in kind are due to financial constraints. The key assumption is that buyers' liquidity is private information. Buyers who are financially constrained may prove their hardship by making part of the payment in kind. The paper models explicitly the credit market imperfections which lead to payments in kind and yields predictions which are consistent with a number of empirical observations. In particular, it offers a coherent explanation for the recent explosion of barter in Russia and other former Soviet republics.

Keywords: In-kind payments; barter; countertrade; financial constraints; price discrimination

JEL-codes: D82; F10; G20

28 pages, First version: June 9, 1998. Revised: February 10, 2000.

Full text files 

hastef0244.rev.pdf.zip PDF-file Full text
hastef0244.rev.pdf PDF-file Full text
hastef0244.rev.ps.zip PostScript file Full text
hastef0244.rev.ps PostScript file Full text

Download statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helena Lundin ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

RePEc:hhs:hastef:0244This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:19:41.