European Business Schools Librarian's Group

SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance,
Stockholm School of Economics

No 249: Labor- and Product-Market Structure and Excess Labor

Björn Segendorff
Additional contact information
Björn Segendorff: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract: This study analyzes under what labor- and product-market structures a firm may hire more labor than needed to produce its profit maximizing output. Three labor-market structures are studied: (1) decentralized (firm-specific unions), (2) one-sided centralization (central union and several firms), and (3) centralized (central union and employers' association). Excess labor is explained by the risk-sharing motive that in the model exists between the risk-averse workers and the risk-neutral firm owner. Labor may be excessively hired in any of the labor-market structures and under a wide range of product-market structures; duopoly, oligopoly etc.

Keywords: Efficient wage bargaining; centralization; market power; technical efficiency.

JEL-codes: J21; J51; L11

19 pages, August 31, 1998

Full text files 

hastef0249.pdf.zip PDF-file Full text
hastef0249.pdf PDF-file Full text
hastef0249.ps.zip PostScript file Full text
hastef0249.ps PostScript file Full text

Download statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helena Lundin ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

RePEc:hhs:hastef:0249This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:19:41.