European Business Schools Librarian's Group
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance,
Stockholm School of Economics
No 316: Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions
Kai A. Konrad, Wolfgang Peters and Karl Wärneryd ()
Additional contact information
Kai A. Konrad: Free University of Berlin, Postal: Boltzmannstrasse 20, D-14195 Berlin, Germany
Wolfgang Peters: The European University Viadrina, Postal: Grosse Scharrnstrasse 59, D-15230 Frankfurt/Oder, Germany
Karl Wärneryd: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract: In a first-price all-pay auction buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non-cooperative delegation equilibrium and the delegation contracts are asymmetric, even if the buyers and the auction are perfectly symmetric.
Keywords: First-price all-pay auctions; contests; strategic delegation
JEL-codes: D44
12 pages, April 22, 1999
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