European Business Schools Librarian's Group

SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance,
Stockholm School of Economics

No 342: Do Market-Based Incentives Lower the Cost of Compliance?

Magnus Allgulin
Additional contact information
Magnus Allgulin: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract: This paper analyzes policies for regulating polluting firms under imperfect monitoring. The main finding is that a certain emission target is always more costly to enforce if there exists a market for emission permits than if there is none. The intuition is that a market restricts the regulatory agency to imposing incentive schemes which are linear in firms' emission levels, and these are less powerful than the best non-linear incentive schemes. Another result is that monitoring and monetary incentives are complementary policy instruments.

Keywords: Monitoring; quota; market; emission permits

JEL-codes: Q28; Q38

23 pages, October 1999

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