European Business Schools Librarian's Group

SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance,
Stockholm School of Economics

No 0458: Credit Claiming

Amihai Glazer and Björn Segendorff
Additional contact information
Amihai Glazer: Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, USA
Björn Segendorff: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract: We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who engage in team production. The public observes the organization’s performance, but is unable to determine the separate contributions of the leader and of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for the good work of his subordinate. We find conditions which induce the leader to claim credit (both truthfully and untruthfully), and the conditions which lead the leader to appoint a subordinate of low ability.

Keywords: Leader; Credit claiming; asymmetric information; Equilibrium

JEL-codes: C72; D72; D82; J33

15 pages, August 14, 2001

Full text files 

hastef0458.pdf PDF-file Full text

Download statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helena Lundin ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

RePEc:hhs:hastef:0458This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:19:41.