European Business Schools Librarian's Group

SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance,
Stockholm School of Economics

No 485: Preparation and toolkit learning

Mark Voorneveld ()
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Mark Voorneveld: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract: A product set of pure strategies is a prep set ("prep" is short for "preparation") if it contains at least one best reply to any consistent belief that a player may have about the strategic behavior of his opponents. Minimal prep sets are shown to exists in a class of strategic games satisfying minor topological conditions. The concept of minimal prep sets is compared with (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria, minimal curb sets, and rationalizability. Additional dynamic motivation for the concept is provided by a model of adaptive play that is shown to settle down in minimal prep sets.

Keywords: noncooperative games; inertia; status quo bias; adaptive play; procedural rationality

JEL-codes: C72; D83

26 pages, January 4, 2002

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