European Business Schools Librarian's Group

SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance,
Stockholm School of Economics

No 714: Epistemic robustness of sets closed under rational behavior

Geir Asheim, Mark Voorneveld () and Jörgen W. Weibull
Additional contact information
Geir Asheim: Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo, Postal: P.O. Box 1095 Blindern, NO-0317 Oslo, Norway
Mark Voorneveld: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Jörgen W. Weibull: Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

Abstract: This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies.

Keywords: epistemic game theory; epistemic robustness; rationalizability; closedness under rational behavior; mutual p-belief

JEL-codes: C72; D83

16 pages, March 30, 2009

Full text files 

hastef0714.pdf PDF-file Full text

Download statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helena Lundin ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

RePEc:hhs:hastef:0714This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:19:42.