European Business Schools Librarian's Group
IESE Research Papers,
IESE Business School
No D/854: Collusive networks in market-sharing agreements under the presence of an antitrust authority
Flavia Roldan ()
Additional contact information
Flavia Roldan: IESE Business School, Postal: Research Division, Av Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, SPAIN
Abstract: This paper studies how the presence of an antitrust authority affects market-sharing agreements made by firms. These agreements prevent firms from entering each other's market. The set of these agreements defines a collusive network, which is pursued by antitrust authorities. This article shows that while in the absence of the antitrust authority, a network is stable if its alliances are large enough when considering the antitrust authority, and more competitive structures can be sustained through bilateral agreements. Antitrust laws may have a pro-competitive effect, as they give firms in large alliances more incentives to cut their agreements at once.
Keywords: market-sharing; economic networks; antitrust authorit; oligopoly
34 pages, April 7, 2010
Full text files
DI-0854-E.pdf
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Noelia Romero ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0854This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:20:02.