IESE Research Papers,
IESE Business School

Abstract: This paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved. The equilibrium is efficient, and the paradoxes associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting to noise traders. The rate at which equilibria in finite replica markets with n traders approach the equilibrium in the continuum economy is 1 n , slower than the rate of convergence to price-taking behavior (1 n ); and the per capita welfare loss is dissipated at the rate 1 n , slower than the rate at which inefficiency due to market power vanishes (1 n2 ). The model admits a einterpretation in which behavioral traders coexist with rational traders, and it allows us to characterize the amount of induced mispricing.

Keywords: adverse selection; information acquisition; double auction; multi-unit auctions; rate convergence; behavioral traders; complementarities

38 pages, May 7, 2011

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