Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for World Economics
No 1275:
Does US Aid Buy UN General Assembly Votes? A Disaggregated Analysis
Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele
Abstract: Using panel data for 143 countries over the period
1973-2002, this paper empirically analyzes the influence of US aid on
voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We use disaggregated aid data
to account for the fact that various forms of aid may differ in their
ability to induce political support by recipients. We obtain strong
evidence that US aid buys voting compliance in the Assembly. More
specifically, our results suggest that general budget support and untied
grants are the major aid categories by which recipients have been induced
to vote in line with the United States. When replicating the analysis for
other G7 donors, no comparable patterns emerge.
Keywords: Bilateral Aid, UN General Assembly, Voting; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: F33; (follow links to similar papers)
24 pages, April 2006
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