Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for World Economics
No 935:
Lohnfortzahlung und Krankenstand
Alfred Boss
Abstract: Sickness benefit income reduces an employee's opportunity
costs of absence from work. In the Federal Republic of Germany the
institutional arrangement was changed several times in the 19511998
period. The paper investigates the effects on absence behavior. According
to the empirical analysis, moral hazard is a serious problem in Germany.
The paper discusses some institutional changes which would significantly
reduce moral hazard.
Keywords: Sickness benefit income, absence rate of employees, work incentives; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: I18; I38; (follow links to similar papers)
25 pages, June 1999
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