Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for World Economics
No 961:
The New Institutional Economics of Antitrust and Regulation
Frank Bickenbach, Lars Kumkar and Rüdiger Soltwedel
Abstract: Hybrid governance structures between markets and
hierarchies in many industries, e.g., in energy and telecommunications,
challenge antitrust and regulation policy. The paper focuses on the
theoretical and methodological basis provided by the New Institutional
Economics (NIE) for analyzing the economics of complex vertical and
horizontal coordination problems. It sketches the specific view of NIE at
industrial organization, antitrust and regulation, discusses three current
issues  the European policy concerning complex vertical contracts,
regulatory reform of the electricity industry and the allocation of
regulatory competencies in the EU Â and presents some implications of NIE
for economic policy making, research and advisory activities.
Keywords: New institutional economics, antitrust, regulation, incomplete contracts, regulatory reform, economic models of federalism.; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D23; D72; H11; K21; K23; L22; L42; L43; L51; (follow links to similar papers)
65 pages, December 1999
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