Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for World Economics
No 977:
Regulation of Europe's Network Industries: The Perspective of the New Economic Theory of Federalism
Frank Bickenbach
Abstract: The paper starts with a description of major reforms of EU
policy in the network industries. Based on the normative economics of
regulation, it then points out generic information and transaction cost
problems of regulatory policy making. An appropriate allocation of
regulatory competencies may help mitigate these problems. Focusing on the
federal allocation of competencies it is argued that traditional
economic theories of federalism should be complemented by
contract-theoretic and transaction-cost-political approaches. There has
been some progress in recent years in developing such a new economic
theory of federalism. Basic ideas and some insights of this theory are
discussed with regard to the appropriate federal allocation of
competencies for the regulation of the European network industries.
Keywords: Network industries, regulation, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, economic models of federalism; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D7; D82; H11; H77; L43; L51; (follow links to similar papers)
46 pages, April 2000
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