Nikolaos Antonakakis (), Harald Badinger () and Wolf Heinrich Reuter ()
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Nikolaos Antonakakis: Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business; Department of Economics and Finance, University of Portsmouth
Harald Badinger: Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business; Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO)
Wolf Heinrich Reuter: Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business
Abstract: This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the evolution of EU member states' power, the EU's capability to act (efficiency), and the proportionality of the voting system in the Council of Ministers from the treaties of Rome in 1958 till the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and beyond, using a wide range of alternative power indices. Moreover, it considers explicitly the relevance of additional legal provisions (such as the 'Luxembourg Compromise', the 'Demographic Clause', and the 'Ioannina Compromise') and the implications of novel, more recently introduced voting rules such as reverse qualified majority voting.
Keywords: Council, Enlargement, Efficiency, EU, Member States, Power Index
JEL-codes: D72; K33; E61 May 2014
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