European Business Schools Librarian's Group

Department of Economics Working Papers,
Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics

Games with the Total Bandwagon Property

Jun Honda ()
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Jun Honda: Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business

Abstract: We consider the class of two-player symmetric n x n games with the total bandwagon property (TBP) introduced by Kandori and Rob (1998). We show that a game has TBP if and only if the game has 2^n - 1 symmetric Nash equilibria. We extend this result to bimatrix games by introducing the generalized TBP. This sheds light on the (wrong) conjecture of Quint and Shubik (1997) that any n x n bimatrix game has at most 2^n - 1 Nash equilibria. As for an equilibrium selection criterion, I show the existence of a ½-dominant equilibrium for two subclasses of games with TBP: (i) supermodular games; (ii) potential games. As an application, we consider the minimum-effort game, which does not satisfy TBP, but is a limit case of TBP.

Keywords: Bandwagon, Nash Equilibrium, Number of Equilibria, Coordination Game, Equilibrium Selection

JEL-codes: C62; C72; C73 July 2015

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