European Business Schools Librarian's Group
Department of Economics Working Papers,
Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics
No 211: Cognitive Hierarchies in the Minimizer Game
Ulrich Berger (), Hannelore De Silva () and Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling ()
Additional contact information
Ulrich Berger: Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business
Hannelore De Silva: Department Finance, Accounting and Statistics , Vienna University of Economics and Business
Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling: Institute of Economics, Ulm University
Abstract: Experimental tests of choice predictions in one-shot games show only little support for Nash equilibrium (NE). Poisson Cognitive Hierarchy (PCH) and level-k (LK) are behavioral models of the thinking-steps variety where subjects differ in the number of levels of iterated reasoning they perform. Camerer et al. (2004) claim that substituting the Poisson parameter tau = 1.5 yields a parameter-free PCH model (pfPCH) which predicts experimental data considerably better than NE. We design a new multi-person game, the Minimizer Game, as a testbed to compare initial choice predictions of NE, pfPCH and LK. Data obtained from two large-scale online experiments strongly reject NE and LK, but are well in line with the point prediction of pfPCH.
JEL-codes: C72; C90; D01; D83 January 2016
Note: PDF Document
Full text files
wp211.pdf
Report problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:wiw:wiwwuw:wuwp211This page generated on 2024-10-31 04:36:10.