European Business Schools Librarian's Group
Department of Economics Working Papers,
Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics
No 380: Anti-corruption policy and economic growth
Johan Gustafsson (), Klaus Prettner () and Fei Xu ()
Additional contact information
Johan Gustafsson: Department of Economics, Umea University
Klaus Prettner: Department of Economics, Vienna University of Economics and Business
Fei Xu: Department of Economics, Umea University
Abstract: We explore the effects of anti-corruption policies on economic growth and welfare within an R&D-based economic growth framework. The government taxes households to fund infrastructure that can be used in the production of final goods and in R&D. Government officials can embezzle funds and use them for their own consumption purposes. However, this comes at the cost of potentially being detected and facing a corresponding punishment. While public officials endogenously decide on the level of corruption, the state decides on the extent of anti-corruption policies, how severe the punishment is, and the income tax level. We show that there is an interior welfare-maximizing level of the tax rate and of anti-corruption effort. The effect of anti-corruption policies on growth and welfare critically depends on the effectiveness of policies in increasing crime detection and the productivity of infrastructure. If the state decides to invest more in anti-corruption measures or increase the pecuniary punishment, economic growth and welfare may actually decrease.
Keywords: Corruption, Fiscal Policy, Long-Run Economic Development, Infrastructure, Welfare
JEL-codes: D73; H54; O18; O30; O41 August 2025
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WP380.pdf
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