European Business Schools Librarian's Group

HEC Research Papers Series,
HEC Paris

No 722: Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets

Herve CRES and Mich TVEDE
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Mich TVEDE: University of Copenhagen

Abstract: An economy with two dates is considered, on state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans b voting -one share, one vote- and at r-majority stable equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most rx100 percent of the shareholders.

Keywords: general equilibrium; incomplete markets; firms; voting

JEL-codes: D21; D52; D71; G39

27 pages, February 1, 2001

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