HEC Research Papers Series,
HEC Paris

Abstract: Voters' preferences depend on the available information. Following Case-Based Decision Theory, we assume that this information is processed additively. We prove that the collective preferences deduced from the individual ones through majority vote cannot be arbitrary, as soon as a winning quota is required. The proof is based on a new result on random walks.

Keywords: voting theory; quotas; random walks

JEL-codes: D72; D80

20 pages, May 1, 2002

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