European Business Schools Librarian's Group

Les Cahiers de Recherche,
HEC Paris

No 761: Majority vote following a debate

Nicolas VIEILLE () and Itzhak GILBOA ()

Abstract: Voters determine their preferences over alternatives based on cases (or arguments) that are raised in the public debate. Each voter is characterized by a matrix, measuring how much support each case lends to each alternative, and her ranking is additive in cases. We show that the majority vote in such a society can be any function from sets of cases to binary relations over alternatives. A similar result holds for voting with quota in the case of two alternatives.

Keywords: Case-based decision theory; voting theory; debates

JEL-codes: D72; D82

20 pages, March 1, 2002

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