European Business Schools Librarian's Group

Les Cahiers de Recherche,
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No 765: On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects

Stefano LOVO , Gian Luigi ALBANO and Fabrizio GERMANO
Additional contact information
Gian Luigi ALBANO: ELSE and Department of Economics, University College London
Fabrizio GERMANO: Departamento d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We consider two ascending auctions for multiple objects: the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) and the the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We first derive a (competitive) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the JAMO by exploiting the strategic equivalence between the JAMO and the Survival Auction which consists of a finite sequence of sealed-bid auctions. Then, we prove that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO do not have a counterpart in the JAMO. However, it is shown that certain collusive equilibria based on retaliatory strategies do exist in both auctions.

Keywords: Multi-unit auctions; Ascending auctions; FCC auctions; Collusion; Retaliation

JEL-codes: C72; D44

28 pages, September 1, 2002

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