European Business Schools Librarian's Group

HEC Research Papers Series,
HEC Paris

No 773: Continuous-Time Games of Timing

VIEILLE Nicolas (), LARAKI Rida () and SOLAN Eilon ()
Additional contact information
LARAKI Rida: Laboratoire d'Econométrie de l'Ecole Polytechnique
SOLAN Eilon: Kellog School of Management, Postal: Northwestern University

Abstract: We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games of complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a subgame perfect e-equilibrium, for each e > 0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.

Keywords: Timing games; war of attrition; preemption games; subgame perfect equilibrium

JEL-codes: C72; C73

36 pages, January 3, 2003

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