European Business Schools Librarian's Group

Les Cahiers de Recherche,
HEC Paris

No 785: Linkage principle, Multi-dimensional Signals and Blind Auctions

FOUCAULT Thierry () and LOVO Stefano ()

Abstract: We compare the seller’s expected revenue in a second price sealed bid auction for a single object in which bidders receive multidimensional signals. Bidders’ valuations for the object depend on their signals and a signal observed privately by the seller. We show in various examples that the seller can be better off not revealing publicly his signal. Hence the linkage principle does not necessarily hold when bidders receive multidimensional signals.

Keywords: Auction Theory; Linkage Principle; Multidimensional Signals; Blind Auctions

JEL-codes: D44

10 pages, August 1, 2003

Full text files

6d2f84aa17c704b62d3c08adf70d9150.pdf PDF-file 

Download statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Antoine Haldemann ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

This page generated on 2018-02-22 16:52:56.