Hervé Crès () and Utku Ünver
Abstract: When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the "worst-case" scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super majority rate as high as 1-1/n is adopted. In this paper the authors assume that a lower d-dimensional (d
Keywords: spatial voting; super majority; ideology; mean voter theorem; random point set
23 pages, February 6, 2006
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