Brian HILL ()
Abstract: It is well-known that classical models of belief are not realistic representations of human doxastic capacity; equally, models of actions involving beliefs, such as decisions based on beliefs, or changes of beliefs, suffer from similar inaccuracies. In this paper, a general framework is presented which permits a more realistic modelling both of instantaneous states of belief, and of the operations involving them.
Keywords: Representations of belief; bounded rationality; logical omniscience; awareness; logical locality; belief dynamics; iterated revision; Gärdenfors postulates; rational choice theory; framing effect
30 pages, October 26, 2006
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