European Business Schools Librarian's Group

Les Cahiers de Recherche,
HEC Paris

No 884: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information

LOVO Stefano ()

Abstract: We de ne belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as se- quential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payo s that includes all belief-free equilibrium payo s. Conversely, any payo in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payo

Keywords: repeated game with incomplete information; Harsanyi doctrine; belief-free equilibria

JEL-codes: C72; C73

31 pages, December 1, 2007

Full text files

8e8373f82936d3f72fadfb86f3087056.pdf PDF-file 

Download statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Antoine Haldemann ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

This page generated on 2018-02-22 16:52:58.