HEC Research Papers Series,
HEC Paris

Abstract: Author's abstract. Judgment aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of barely judgments of preference. The paper briefly sums it up, privileging the variant that formalizes judgment by a logical syntax. The theory derives from Kornhauser and Sager’s doctrinal paradox and Pettit’s discursive dilemma, which List and Pettit turned into an impossibility theorem - the first of a long list to come. After mentioning this stage, the paper restates three theorems that are representative of the current work, by Nehring and Puppe, Dokow and Holzman, and Dietrich and Mongin,respectively, and it concludes by explaining how Dietrich and List have recovered Arrow’s theorem as a particular application of the theory.

Keywords: judgment aggregation; logical aggregation; doctrinal paradox; discursive dilemma; social choice theory

JEL-codes: D70; D71; D79

15 pages, February 1, 2011

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