European Business Schools Librarian's Group

Les Cahiers de Recherche,
HEC Paris

No 1093: Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games

Stefano Lovo () and Tristan Tomala
Additional contact information
Stefano Lovo: HEC

Abstract: We introduce the model of Stochastic Revision Games where a finite set of players control a state variable and receive payoffs as a function of the state at a terminal deadline. There is a Poisson clock which dictates when players are called to choose of revise their actions. This paper studies the existence of Markov perfect equilibria in those games. We give an existence proof assuming some form of correlation.

Keywords: Stochastic Revision Games; Games Theory; Equilibria

JEL-codes: C73

32 pages, September 1, 2015

Full text files

papers.cfm?abstract_id=2622084&download=yes PDF-file 

Download statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Antoine Haldemann ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

This page generated on 2018-02-22 16:53:04.