European Business Schools Librarian's Group

HEC Research Papers Series,
HEC Paris

No 1236: Incentive Constrained Risk Sharing, Segmentation, and Asset Pricing

Johan Hombert (), Bruno Biais and Pierre-Olivier Weill

Abstract: Incentive problems make assets imperfectly pledgeable. Introducing these problems in an otherwise canonical general equilibrium model yields a rich set of implications. Asset markets are endogenously segmented. There is a basis going always in the same direction, as the price of any risky asset is lower than that of the replicating portfolio of Arrow securities. Equilibrium expected returns are concave in consumption betas, in line with empirical findings. As the dispersion of consumption betas of the risky assets increases, incentive constraints are relaxed and the basis reduced. When hit by adverse shocks, relatively risk tolerant agents sell the safest assets they hold.

Keywords: Asset markets; Risk Sharing; Asset Pricing

JEL-codes: A10

72 pages, October 24, 2017

Full text files

papers.cfm?abstract_id=3057923 PDF-file Full text

Download statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Antoine Haldemann ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

RePEc:ebg:heccah:1236This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:19:53.