Itzhak Gilboa (), Stefania Minardi (), Larry Samuelson and David Schmeidler
Abstract: We discuss the notion of a state of the world in axiomatic decision theory, and argue that it should be viewed as an "eventuality" that is implicitly assumed to be independent of the process by which preferences are observed. The distinction between states, which are assumed to resolve all uncertainty, and eventualities suggests certain limitations on the axiomatic approach for defining and measuring mental concepts (such as belief ) by observed choices
Keywords: axiomatic; decision; theory
JEL-codes: A10
24 pages, May 15, 2018
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