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Abstract: This paper proposes universal provision of information about the income inequality involved in the creation of a good as a means of moderating income inequality. Existing evidence suggests that a section of the population would be willing to pay more for goods whose production involves less excessive income inequality. We show, on a simple model, that supplying inequality information to such a population under competitive markets will in general lead to a reduction in global income inequality. The effect will be stronger the more inequality averse the population. Moreover, the outcome will be socially efficient. Possibilities for (de-centralized) implementation are also discussed.

Keywords: Income inequality; information provision; externalities; inequality aversion

JEL-codes: D30; D63; D83; J30

71 pages, January 13, 2020

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