European Business Schools Librarian's Group

HEC Research Papers Series,
HEC Paris

No 1580: Collusion through Common Leadership

Alejandro Herrera Caicedo, Jessica Jeffers and Elena Prager
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Alejandro Herrera Caicedo: University of Wisconsin-Madison
Jessica Jeffers: HEC Paris
Elena Prager: University of Rochester

Abstract: This paper studies whether common leadership, defined as two firms sharing executives or board directors, contributes to collusion. Using an explicit measure of labor market collusion from unsealed court evidence, we find that the probability of collusion between two firms increases by 12 percentage points after the onset of common leadership, compared to a baseline rate of 1.2 percent in the absence of common leaders. These results are not driven by closeness of product or labor market competition. Our findings are consistent with the increasing attention toward common leadership under Clayton Act Section 8.

Keywords: Leadership; Clayton Act Section 8

JEL-codes: D20

41 pages, June 2, 2025

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